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ADMIRALTY JURISDICTION: THE NEW WAVE IN
ASBESTOS LITIGATION
Various jiurisdictions have developed conflicting tests to deter-
mine the limitations period for bringing an asbestos action.
Since Congress has enacted a new statute of imitationsfor ad-
miralty actions, a controversy is raging over which of the various
tests should apply. This comment discusses the development of
each of the tests, analyzes them in relation to admiralty law, and
concludes that the discovery rule should be applied in all asbes-
tos claims in admiralty.
I. INTRODUCTION
Ten years ago in Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Products Corp. ,' the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that an insu-
lation worker who contracted asbestosis and mesothelioma2 from
working with asbestos products could recover damages from the manu-
facturer of those products. That landmark decision triggered a great
deal of asbestos litigation that currently exceeds 16,000 suits.' While
the employee's claim in Borel related to asbestos exposure on land, the
Fourth Circuit, under the aegis of admiralty jurisdiction, extended the
right to recover damages to shipyard workers who contracted asbestos
related diseases from exposure occurring on navigable waters.4
This comment focuses on the use of admiralty law in asbestos liti-
gation and the effect of admiralty law on the application of a statute of
limitations.5 Beginning with a survey of the general development of
asbestos litigation, this comment analyzes the use of the statute of limi-
tations in asbestos litigation in two Fourth Circuit jurisdictions and the
effect of admiralty jurisdiction on the limitations period for tort claims.
This comment concludes by examining the recently enacted Uniform
Statute of Limitations for Maritime Torts6 and arguing for the adop-
tion of the discovery rule in applying the new statute of limitations in
admiralty.
1. 493 F.2d 1076 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 869 (1974).
2. For a discussion of these diseases, see infra notes 17-18.
3. 68 A.B.A.J. 397 (1982); see also The Washington Post, Aug. 27, 1982, at F 12
(Johns-Manville Corporation, the nation's leading asbestos producer, presently
faces over 16,000 lawsuits resulting from asbestos exposure); 5 LEGAL TIMES 2, at
col. I (Apr. 18, 1983) (2,700 asbestos cases pending before Philadelphia courts).
4. White v. Johns-Manville Corp., 662 F.2d 234 (4th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454
U.S. 1163 (1982).
5. For a more detailed analysis of the background of asbestos litigation, see Com-
ment, An Explanation ofRecurring Issues in Asbestos Litigation, 46 ALB. L. REV.
1307 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Comment, An Explanation of Recurring Issues];
Comment, Asbestos Litigation.: The Dust Has Yet to Settle, 7 FORDHAM URB. L.J.
55 (1978).
6. 46 U.S.C. § 763a (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
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II. BACKGROUND
The growth of asbestos litigation is due in large part to industry-
wide use of asbestos. Asbestos, with its great ability to withstand heat,7
is highly regarded by manufacturers because of its tensile strength, flex-
ibility, and resistance to chemicals, corrosion, and decay.' Since its
commercial development in the late 1800's, asbestos has been used in
textiles, shingles, cement, brake linings, insulation, shipbuilding mater-
ials, and in numerous other products.9 Indeed, asbestos has become
such an integral part of today's society that virtually all urban dwellers
have asbestos fibers in their lungs.'
Shipbuilders have been particularly vulnerable to asbestos related
diseases since asbestos products have long played an important role in
shipbuilding, "l serving as insulation for boilers, pipes, and other equip-
ment. By the end of World War II the growth of the Navy had led to
the employment of over four and one-half million persons in the ship-
yards, and exposure to asbestos was a part of each worker's employ-
ment.' 2 As a consequence of this exposure, shipyard workers as well as
other asbestos workers suffer from asbestos related diseases which re-
sult from the inhalation of airborne asbestos fibers or dust. 13 Once in-
haled and swallowed, the fibers are deposited and retained in the
lungs, 4 the digestive system,15 or in other parts of the body.'6 Asbesto-
sis'" and mesothelioma,'8 the two most widely known asbestos related
7. U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMIN. PUB. No.
3040, HEALTH HAZARDS OF ASBESTOS 4 (1979) [hereinafter cited as OSHA]; P.
BRODEUR, THE ASBESTOS HAZARD 4 (1980); 4A R. GRAY, ATTORNEY'S TEXT-
BOOK OF MEDICINE 205C.03 (3d ed. Supp. 1982).
8. BRODEUR, supra note 7, at 5; STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 128 (24th ed.
1982).
9. OSHA, supra note 7, at 2-3; BRODEUR, supra note 7, at 5-7; GRAY, supra note 7, at
205C. 10. One treatise lists over 75 occupations in which workers are exposed to
asbestos. See id 205C.I1(1).
10. U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, DISABILITY COMPENSATION FOR ASBESTOS-AssOCIATED
DISEASES IN THE UNITED STATES 24 (1981) [hereinafter cited as DISABILITY
COMPENSATION].
11. See White v. Johns-Manville Corp., 662 F.2d 234, 239 (4th Cir. 1981), cert. denied,
454 U.S. 1163 (1982) (installation of asbestos on ships essential to maritime
industry).
12. Selikoff, Lilis & Nicholson, Asbestos Disease in United States Shipyards, 330 AN-
NALS N.Y. ACAD. SCI. 295, 297-98 (1979).
13. OSHA, supra note 7, at 4; BRODEUR, supra note 7, at 8; GRAY, supra note 7, at
205C.20.
14. GRAY, supra note 7, at 205C.20.
15. OSHA, supra note 7, at 4.
16. BRODEUR, supra note 7, at 8.
17. Asbestosis is a chronic lung disease evidenced by scarred lung tissue and shortness
of breath. Id at 9; U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, AN INTERIM REPORT TO CONGRESS ON
OCCUPATIONAL DISEASES 15 (1980) [hereinafter cited as INTERIM REPORT].
18. Mesothelioma is a pleural (lungs) or peritoneal (abdomen) form of cancer which
is generally fatal. DISABILITY COMPENSATION, supra note 10, at 3; BRODEUR,
supra note 7, at 10- I. Mesothelioma is associated exclusively with asbestos expo-
sure. DISABILITY COMPENSATION, supra note 7, at 4. But see GRAY, supra note 7,
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diseases, 19 are characterized by long periods of latency, i e., the period
of time between the exposure to the asbestos product and the manifes-
tation of the asbestos related disease.2" Asbestosis usually manifests
ten to twenty years after the initial exposure,2' while mesothelioma
manifests twenty to fifty years after such exposure.2 2 Because of the
long latency periods, asbestos related diseases are expected to appear
into the twenty-first century.23
As the number of asbestos related disease cases began to increase,
the medical field recognized a causal connection between the victim's
work and his injury.24 Once the disease was tied to the worker's occu-
pation, the worker's compensation systems adapted the statutory cover-
age to include these insidious diseases, although recovery was
infrequently awarded.25 Accordingly, the development of product lia-
bility law led workers to seek recovery from their employers under the
worker's compensation system and from the asbestos manufacturers
under a third party action.26
The first third party attempt failed. In a 1971 case, Bassham v.
at 205C.72 ("In about eighty-five percent of all cases of mesothelioma, asbestos
exposure can be found."); Note, The Causation Problem in Asbestos Litigation.: Is
There an Alternative Theory of Liability?, 15 IND. L. REV. 679, 694 n.77 (1982)
(according to 1972 studies, mesothelioma may be caused by insulation material
other than asbestos).
19. Cancers associated with asbestos exposure include cancer of the esophagus,
larnyx, oropharynx, stomach, colon, rectum, and kidney. See DISABILITY COM-
PENSATION, supra note 10, at 4; INTERIM REPORT, supra note 17, at 15; see also
GRAY, supra note 7, at 205C.71-.74 (lung cancer, gastro-intestinal cancers, and
other cancers may result from asbestos exposure).
20. See generally STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 768 (24th ed. 1982).
21. Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Products Corp., 493 F.2d 1076, 1083 (5th Cir. 1973),
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 869 (1974); BRODEUR, supra note 7, at 9; see also Mansfield,
Asbestos: The Cases and the Insurance Problem, 15 FORUM 860, 862 (1980) (aver-
age manifestation period for asbestosis is 17 years, although the disease has been
detected in 10 years or less after exposure).
22. BRODEUR, supra note 7, at 10; see also Mansfield, supra note 21, at 864 (25 to 40
year latency). But see The Washington Post, Aug. 27, 1982, at A4, col. I (lawyer
exposed to asbestos in 1967 died of mesothelioma 11 years later).
23. DISABILITY COMPENSATION, supra note 10, at 5. As to the continued manifesta-
tion of asbestos related diseases, see Motley, The Lid Comes Off, 14 TRIAL 20
(Apr. 1980), for the view that asbestos manufacturers have actively aided the
growth of asbestos disease cases by their failure to publicize the harmful effects of
asbestos exposure when they were aware of the effects as early as the 1930's.
24. Sweeney & Castleman, Asbestos Diseases and Compensation, 330 ANNALS N.Y.
ACAD. SCI. 272, 273 (1979). Both workers and founders of the asbestos industry
suffered from exposure to the product. For instance, Henry Ward Johns, the
founder of Johns-Manville Corp., died of asbestosis in 1898. Id
25. Id at 275-77. Even today, workers with occupational diseases replace only five
percent of their lost income with worker's compensation benefits. INTERIM RE-
PORT, supra note 17, at 3.
26. Note, Compensating Victims of Occupational Disease, 93 HARV. L. REV. 916, 917-
18 (1980). Recovery under the worker's compensation system is still pursued by
asbestos workers. E.g., Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Products Corp., 493 F.2d 1076,
1100 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 869 (1974); Shifflett v. Powhatten Min-
ing Co., 293 Md. 198, 442 A.2d 980 (1982).
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Owens-Corning Fiber Glass Corp. ,27 an insulation worker sued the
manufacturers of various asbestos products under the strict products
liability theory set forth in section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of
Torts.28 The Bassham court narrowly construed section 402A and held
that it would not apply to a disease like asbestosis, which is contracted
over a long period of time.29
Two years later, the Borel" court adopted a position contrary to
that of the Bassham court and applied section 402A to an asbestos insu-
lation worker's claim. In addition, the Borel court noted that under
Texas law, the employee could pursue his worker's compensation claim
and then file his third party action without fear of the statute of limita-
tions bar.3' In adhering to the Supreme Court's decision in Urie v.
Thompson ,32 the court noted that the cause of action for an asbestos
related disease would not arise until the plaintiff discovered his dis-
ease.33 Again, the Bore? holding directly contradicts the Bassham
court's holding that "any exposure which occurred more than three
years before the filing of the action. . . would be barred by the statute
of limitations. 34
In the next major asbestos decision, Karjala v. Johns-Manville
Products Corp. ,35 the Eighth Circuit elaborated upon the Borel court's
discussion of the statute of limitations issue. 36 The Karjala court held
that the cause of action arises when the disease manifests itself in such
a way that the causal relationship to the product can be established.37
The statute of limitations thus does not begin to run until the plaintiff
knows he is suffering from a disease caused by asbestos.
Since the Borel and Karjala decisions, many of those courts deal-
ing with asbestos litigation often cite the "discovery rule,"3 but some
jurisdictions refuse to adopt this rule short of legislative intervention.39
27. 327 F. Supp. 1007 (D.N.M. 1971).
28. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
29. Bassham v. Owens-Coming Fiber Glass Corp., 327 F. Supp. 1007, 1009 (D.N.M.
1971).
30. Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Products Corp., 493 F.2d 1076, 1088-89 (5th Cir. 1973),
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 869 (1974). For a discussion of the opinion shortly after it
was decided, see 59 A.B.A.J. 1454 (1973).
31. Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Products Corp., 493 F.2d 1076, 1101 (5th Cir. 1973),
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 869 (1974).
32. 337 U.S. 163 (1949).
33. Bore, 493 F.2d at 1102.
34. Bassham v. Owens-Coming Fiber Glass Corp., 327 F. Supp. 1007, 1009 (D.N.M.
1971).
35. 523 F.2d 155 (8th Cir. 1975).
36. Id at 160.
37. Id at 161.
38. See, e.g., Fusco v. Johns-Manville Products Corp., 643 F.2d 1181, 1183 (5th Cir.
1981); Pauley v. Constr. Eng'g, Inc., 528 F. Supp. 759, 764 (S.D. W. Va. 1981);
Strickland v. Johns-Manville Int'l, Corp., 461 F. Supp. 215, 217 (S.D. Tex. 1978).
39. See, e.g., Clutter v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 646 F.2d 1151, 1153 (6th Cir.
1981); Locke v. Johns-Manville Corp., 221 Va. 951, 959, 275 S.E.2d 900, 905-06
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Until recently, a litigant had a greater likelihood of recovery under ad-
miralty law because of the nearly total absence of a statute of limita-
tions;' instead, the doctrine of laches applied requiring a case-by-case
determination of the limitations period.4 The laches doctrine recently
was replaced by the enactment of the Uniform Statute of Limitations
for Maritime Torts,4 2 which mandates a three year limitation on any
admiralty tort action.
III. THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS ISSUE
A. Determining the Limitations Period
In contrast to the doctrine of laches, the statute of limitations
serves as an absolute bar to an otherwise meritorious claim. The un-
derlying purpose of the bar is to protect the defendant from liability for
stale claims.4 3 From a practical standpoint, the claim may be unfair
because "evidence is lost, memories have faded, and witnesses have
disappeared."'  Lacking the necessary proof, defendants are precluded
from establishing a proper defense.
Although the limitations period is generally prescribed by statute,
the judge must determine when the cause of action arose.45 Tradition-
ally, the limitations period began when the negligent act occurred.4 6
This interpretation, however, may charge the plaintiff with knowledge
of his injury before it manifests.47 Judicially created doctrines have
evolved to avoid the harsh consequences of the statute of limitations.4"
(1981); see also Comment, Alabama's Limitation Statutefor Asbestos Victims: A
Legislative Response to Judicial Inaction, 12 CUM. L. REV. 667 (1982).
40. For exceptions to the rule, see infra note 106.
41. See the analysis contained in Giddens v. Isbrandtsen Co., 355 F.2d 125, 127 (4th
Cir. 1966), which states that "the presence of laches is ascertained by a balancing
of the claimant's delay with the proffered excuse, if any, against the defendant's
consequent detriment. The determination demands a weighing of the equities.
These in turn depend upon an assay of the circumstances."
42. 46 U.S.C. § 763a (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
43. See generally W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS § 30, at 144 (4th ed. 1971); Birn-
baum, "First Breath's" Last Gasp. The Discovery Rule in Products Liability Cases,
13 FORUM 279, 279 (1979); Developments in the Law-Statutes of Limitations, 63
HARV. L. REV. 1179, 1185 (1950) [hereinafter cited as Developments in the Law].
Although recent studies of the discovery rule and the limitations period have ap-
peared, see, e.g., Note, Wilson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp. and Statutes of Limi-
tation in Latent Injury Litigation. An Equitable Expansion of the Discovery Rule,
32 CATH. U.L. REV. 471 (1983), probably the most exhaustive study is contained
in Developments in the Law, supra. See generally Note, Statutes of Limitations and
the Discovery Rule in Latent Injury Claims- An Exception or the Law, 43 U. PITr.
L. REV. 501 (1982).
44. Order of R.R. Telegraphers v. Express Agency, 321 U.S. 342, 349 (1944).
45. Developments in the Law, supra note 43, at 1203-05.
46. Id
47. Urie v. Thompson, 337 U.S. 163, 169 (1949); Birnbaum, supra note 43, at 290; see
also Developments in the Law, supra note 43, at 1201.
48. W. PROSSER, supra note 43, § 30, at 144.
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These doctrines, theoretically based on continuing treatment4 9 and
fraudulent concealment or constructive fraud theories, 50 are usually ap-
plied in medical malpractice cases5' and are similar to the discovery
rule.52 The discovery rule states that a cause of action shall not arise
until the plaintiff knows or should have known through reasonable dili-
gence that he has suffered an injury.53
The Supreme Court first employed the discovery rule in Urie v.
Thompson,5 4 a latent disease case. The employee in Urie suffered from
silicosis, a pulmonary disease resulting from the inhalation of coal
dust. 5 He brought suit against his employer, the Missouri Pacific Rail-
road, under the Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELA),56 the
equivalent of a state worker's compensation program. 57 The employer
contended that the employee was barred by the statute of limitations.58
Recognizing that a mechanical application of the statute of limitations
according to the employee's last exposure to coal dust would bar him
from recovery, the Court instead adopted the discovery rule.59  By
utilizing the discovery rule, the Urie Court protected the statute's "hu-
mane legislative plan," which acknowledges the hazardous work per-
formed by railroad employees such as the plaintiff.6"
Over thirty years prior to Urie, the Court of Appeals of Maryland
adopted the discovery rule 61 in the 1917 case of Hahn v. Clay-
49. See, e.g., Samuelson v. Freeman, 75 Wash. 2d 894, 900, 454 P.2d 406, 410 (1969)
("[I]f malpractice is claimed during a continuous and substantially uninterrupted
course of treatment for a particular illness or condition the statute does not begin
to run until the treatment for that particular illness or condition has been termi-
nated."); Ballenger v. Crewell, 38 N.C. App. 50, 58, 247 S.E.2d 287, 293 (1978).
50. See, e.g., Morrison v. Acton, 68 Ariz. 27, 198 P.2d 590 (1948) (constructive fraud,
like fraudulent concealment, suspends the statute until plaintiff learns of the
fraud); Lakeman v. LaFrance, 102 N.H. 300, 156 A.2d 123 (1959) (fraudulent con-
cealment of facts essential to the cause of action suspends the running of the
statute).
51. W. PROSSER, supra note 43, § 30, at 144; Birnbaum, supra note 43, at 282.
52. The language of the "fraudulent concealment" or "constructive fraud" theory is
remarkably similar to that of the discovery rule because the suspension of the
limitations period is lifted when the plaintiff "discovers" the negligent act. See,
e.g., Morrison v. Acton, 68 Ariz. 27, 35, 198 P.2d 590, 595 (1948); Lakeman v.
LaFrance, 102 N.H. 300, 303, 156 A.2d 123, 126 (1959).
53. See, e.g., Waldman v. Rohrbaugh, 241 Md. 137, 145, 215 A.2d 825, 830 (1966).
See generally W. PROSSER, supra note 43, § 30, at 144.
54. 337 U.S. 163 (1949); see Harig v. Johns-Manville Products Corp., 284 Md. 70, 81,
394 A.2d 299, 305 (1978); Note, Stoleson v. United States.: FTCA Expanding the
Discovery Rule in Occupational Disease Cases, 14 J. MAR. L. REV. 873, 881-82
(1981).
55. Urie v. Thompson, 337 U.S. 163, 165-66 (1949).
56. 45 U.S.C. § 51 (1946).
57. Urie v. Thompson, 337 U.S. 163, 165 (1949).
58. Id at 168.
59. Id at 169.
60. Id. at 170. FELA is viewed as having a "humane legislative plan" because it
expanded the remedies available to railway workers. See Tiller v. Atlantic Coast
Line R.R. Co., 318 U.S. 54, 62 (1943); Note, supra note 54, at 884-85.
61. Note, Poffenberger v. Risser-The Discovery Prineaple is the Rule, Not the Excep-
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brook.62 The court of appeals later reinforced the Hahn decision in
Waldman v. Rohrbaugh ,63 holding that a malpractice action accrues
"from the moment of discovery, the moment he [injured party] knows
or should know he has a cause of action within which to sue."64
In 1977, the court of appeals in Harig v. Johns-Manville Products
Corp. 65 further expanded the discovery rule to include latent disease
cases. In Harig, an employee brought suit in the United States District
Court for the District of Maryland alleging that she suffered from
mesothelioma which developed as a result of her exposure to the manu-
facturer's asbestos products twenty-two years prior to her bringing the
suit.66 The district court certified two questions of law to the Court of
Appeals of Maryland. 67 These questions concerned the application of
the statute of limitations to a claim filed twenty-two years after the
plaintiff's last injurious exposure to asbestos.68 In holding that the dis-
covery rule applies in latent disease cases, the court of appeals recog-
nized the employee's cause of action.69
The Harig decision was based upon the rationale underlying the
statute of limitations.7" The court determined that the possible injus-
tice to the employee far outweighed the need to protect the manufac-
tion, 41 MD. L. REV. 451, 457 n.43 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Note, Poffenberger
v. Risser]; Note, The Statute of Limitations in Actionsfor Undiscovered Maprac-
tice, 12 Wyo. L.J. 30, 34 (1957) ("[tlhe discovery rule was probably first advocated
in Hahn v. Claybrook .... ").
62. 130 Md. 179, 100 A. 83 (1917). In Hahn, the patient suffered a skin discoloration
from a drug prescribed by her physician. Id at 187, 100 A. at 86. Since the court
determined that the patient's medical malpractice action was filed seven years af-
ter she knew of her injury, not even the discovery rule could revive her claim. Id
63. 241 Md. 137, 215 A.2d 825 (1966).
64. Id at 145, 215 A.2d at 830. In 1981, the Court of Appeals of Maryland held that
the discovery rule applies to all civil actions. Poffenberger v. Risser, 290 Md. 631,
431 A.2d 677 (1981). See Note, Poffenberger v. Risser, supra note 61, at 451.
65. 284 Md. 70, 394 A.2d 299 (1978).
66. Id at 72, 394 A.2d at 300. The plaintiff was a secretary who worked for a Bal-
timore firm that purchased asbestos products from Johns-Manville; she was ex-
posed to asbestos because of her occasional visits to the manufacturing area and
from handling files which were exposed to asbestos dust. Id
67. The certification was made under MD. CTs. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. §§ 12-601
to -609 (1974).
68. The certified questions of law were:
1. At what time does a plaintiff's cause of action for negligence accrue
when plaintiff developed a disease in late 1975 or early 1976, allegedly as
a result of exposure during the period 1940-55 to a deleterious substance
allegedly occasioned by defendant's negligence?
2. At what time does a plaintiffs cause of action for strict liability ac-
crue when plaintiff developed a disease in late 1975 or early 1976, alleg-
edly as a result of exposure during the period 1940-55 to a deleterious
substance emanating from defendant's products?
Harig v. Johns-Manville Products Corp., 284 Md. 70, 71, 394 A.2d 299, 300
(1978).
69. Id. The employee settled out of court for approximately $500,000. The Evening
Sun (Baltimore), Dec. 30, 1980, at 4, col. 3.
70. Harig v. Johns-Manville Products Corp., 284 Md. 70, 71-72, 394 A.2d 299, 300
19831
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turer from stale claims, since in the case of a latent disease the injured
party is unaware of the cause of action until the disease manifests it-
self.7' Due to the lengthy latency period of a disease like mesothe-
lioma, the plaintiff is "blamelessly ignorant" of his claim.72 According
to the Harig court, a plaintiff cannot be charged with sleeping on his
rights when he cannot determine them.7 3
The Supreme Court of Virginia has taken an approach contrary to
that of the Harig court, and has repeatedly ignored the opportunity to
adopt the discovery rule in latent disease cases.74 The Virginia court
views this action as a legislative function.7" In Locke v. Johns-Manville
Corp. ,76 however, the Supreme Court of Virginia articulated what ap-
pears to be a unique approach to the problem of determining when a
cause of action accrues in a latent disease case. The Locke court deter-
mined that the statutorily prescribed limitations period77 begins to run
when the claimant is "hurt."7 8 Medical experts for both sides must tes-
tify as to when they could have determined the plaintiff was injured,
and the limitations period begins to run from that date, regardless of
whether the plaintiff has experienced the symptoms of his disease.7 9
Applying this novel theory, the Locke court found that the cause of
action was filed within the statutory limit since medical testimony
showed no clinical evidence of mesothelioma before late 1977 or early
1978, and either date would fall within the limitations period.8"
In a similar case decided in the federal district court of Virginia
that year, the injured party was not so fortunate. In Large v. Bucyrus-
(1978). For a discussion of this rationale, see supra notes 41-42 and accompany-
ing text.
71. Harig, 284 Md. at 80, 394 A.2d at 305.
72. Id. at 83, 394 A.2d at 306.
73. Id
74. See, e.g., Locke v. Johns-Manville Corp., 221 Va. 951, 959, 275 S.E.2d 900, 905-06
(1981); Street v. Consumers Mining Corp., 185 Va. 561, 39 S.E.2d 271 (1946). See
generaly Note, Statutes of Limitations in Occupational Disease Cases: Is Locke v.
Johns-Manville Corp. an Alternative to the Discovery Rule, 39 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 263, 273 (1982) (Virginia courts have repeatedly refused to adopt a discovery
rule in the absence of legislative action).
75. Locke v. Johns-Manville Corp., 221 Va. 951, 959, 275 S.E.2d 900, 905-06 (1981);
Street v. Consumers Mining Corp., 185 Va. 561, 566, 39 S.E.2d 271, 272 (1946).
For a discussion of the legislative prerogative rule, see Note, Preserving Causes of
Action in Latent Disease Cases: The Locke v. Johns-Manville Corp. Date-of-the-
Injury Accrual Rule, 68 VA. L. REV. 615, 621-22 (1982).
76. 221 Va. 951, 275 S.E.2d 900 (1981). For a detailed examination of the Locke
decision, see Note, supra note 75; Note, supra note 74.
77. In Virginia, the statutorily prescribed limitations period is attained by a combined
reading of two statutes. Locke v. Johns-Manville Corp., 221 Va. 951, 955, 275
S.E.2d 900, 903 (1981). The two year limitations is mandated by VA. CODE
§ 8.01-243(A) (1977), and the accrual point is defined as "the date the injury is
sustained" under id § 8.01-230.





Erie Co. ,s the plaintiff suffered from a number of respiratory diseases
that he claimed resulted from exposure to silica, stone, and asbestos
dust.82 An affidavit from the defendant's medical expert established
that the disease could have been diagnosed more than two years before
the suit was filed.83 Thus, under the Locke rule, the cause of action was
barred since medical testimony showed that the plaintiff was "hurt"
more than two years before suit was filed.8 4
The Large court reasoned that the plaintiff incurred harm when he
first contracted respiratory ailments; 85 it was irrelevant that the disease
was not diagnosed until after the limitations period had run since the
disease could have been diagnosed within that period.86 In contrast,
under the Maryland rule set forth in Harig,87 the plaintiff could have
successfully argued that his cause of action accrued when he was in-
formed of the respiratory illnesses, for that is when he ascertained the
nature of his disease.
The Locke rule is inherently unfair to latent disease victims be-
cause the disease can often be diagnosed before the plaintiff realizes he
has been injured. 88 Plaintiffs like Large are left with the limited rem-
edy of an inadequate 89 worker's compensation system. While the
Locke rule is more equitable than the last negligent act rule, 90 it stops
short of providing recovery for many asbestos victims with worthy
81. 524 F. Supp. 285 (E.D. Va. 1981).
82. Id. at 286. Those diseases included "silicosis, industrial bronchitis, shortness of
breath, shortening of lifespan and increased probability of cancer." Id
83. Id at 288-89.
84. Id
85. Id
86. Id at 288.
87. Harig v. Johns-Manville Products Corp., 284 Md. 70, 83, 394 A.2d 299, 306
(1978).
88. As the Locke court stated, "it is conceivable that when the disease manifests itself
by symptoms, such as pain, discomfort or impairment of function, expert medical
testimony will demonstrate the injury occurred weeks, months or even years
before the onset of the symptoms." Locke v. Johns-Manville Corp., 221 Va. 951,
959, 275 S.E.2d 900, 905 (1981).
89. Although occupational diseases are now included in the worker's compensation
systems of every state, see Larsen, Occupational Diseases under Workmen's Com-
pensation Laws, 9 U. RICH. L. REV. 87, 88 (1974), severely disabled occupational
disease workers replace only five percent of their lost income with worker's com-
pensation benefits. INTERIM REPORT, supra note 17, at 3. This is largely due to
the difficulty of establishing that the disease is work related. Id The difference in
recovery under the worker's compensation system for a totally disabling acciden-
tal injury as compared to a totally disabling occupational disease is striking: acci-
dental injury claimants receive an average of $23,400, while occupational disease
claimants average $9,700. Kutchens, The Most Exclusive Remedy is No Remedy at
All. Worker's Compensation Coveragefor Occupational Diseases, 32 LAB. L.J. 212,
221 (1981).
90. For an explanation of the last negligent act rule, see supra notes 44-45 & 53 and
accompanying text. In Virginia, the negligent or wrongful act doctrine was first
applied in a latent disease case in 1946. See Street v. Consumers Mining Corp.,
185 Va. 561, 39 S.E.2d 271 (1946). Locke was viewed as an attempt to circumvent
this rule. See Note, supra note 75, at 626 n.85 and accompanying text.
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claims, and commentators are in agreement that action by the Virginia
legislature,9 preferably in the form of a statutory discovery rule,9 2 is
necessary.
B. Admiralty Jurisdiction and the Uniform Statute of Limitations for
Maritime Torts
The assertion of admiralty jurisdiction for shipyard workers suffer-
ing from asbestos related diseases may partially relieve the inequity of
the individual state laws. Admiralty jurisdiction for these claims, how-
ever, is a relatively new theory that was not, at least initially, well re-
ceived. For example, in Bailey v. Johns-Manville Corp. ,9 and Van
Harville v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp. ,9 the courts denied admiralty
jurisdiction for asbestos claims on different grounds. 95 The Fourth Cir-
cuit's decision in White v. Johns-Manville Corp., reversed the trend of
the lower courts and allowed the plaintiffs to recover under admiralty
law.
96
1. Admiralty Jurisdiction and the Doctrine of Laches
Admiralty jurisdiction is derived from the Constitution and the
Judiciary Act of 1789. 97 The scope of admiralty jurisdiction has gener-
ally included "all maritime contracts, torts, and injuries." '98 Until re-
91. See Note, supra note 75, at 629; Note, supra note 74, at 283.
92. See, e.g., Stevenson, Products Liability and the Virginia Statute of Limitations-A
Callfor the Legislative Rescue Squad, 16 U. RICH. L. REV. 323 (1982).
93. 1978 Am. Mar. Cas. 1460 (E.D. Va. 1978).
94. AsB. LIT. REP. (ANDREWS) 3,136 (S.D. Ala. Mar. 27, 1981).
95. In Bailey, the court held there was no significant relationship to a traditional mar-
itime activity. Bailey v. Johns-Manville Corp., 1978 Am. Mar. Cas. 1460, 1465
(E.D. Va. 1978). In Van Harville, the court stated, "[the decision of the Bailey
court that ship insulation has no maritime nexus is simply not correct." Van
Harville v. Johns-Manville Corp., ASB. LIT. REP. (ANDREWS) 3,136, 3,147 (S.D.
Ala. Mar. 27, 1981). However, the Van Harville court determined that admiralty
law did not apply because a latent disease like asbestosis is the result of multiple
exposures, and admiralty jurisdictional tests are designed for single event cases.
Van Harville, ASB. LIT. REP. (ANDREWS) at 3,149.
96. The rationale of White has been adopted by the Second Circuit as well. See
Jacobowitz v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., ASB. LIT. REP. (ANDREWS) 5,718 (E.D.
N.Y. Sept. 28, 1982). But see Austin v. Unarco Ind., Inc., 705 F.2d 1 (1st Cir.
1983); Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. United States Dist. Court, 698 F.2d 967 (9th Cir.
1983).
97. The original grant of jurisdiction contained in the Constitution states: "The judi-
cial power shall extend . . . to all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction."
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. The Judiciary Act of 1789 established that "the district
courts. . . shall have exclusive original cognizance of all civil causes of admiralty
and maritime jurisdiction. . . saving to suitors in all cases, the right of a common
law remedy where the common law is competent to give it." For a general discus-
sion of admiralty jurisdiction, see G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, LAW OF ADMIRALTY
JURISDICTION §§ 1-9, at 18-19 (2d ed. 1975); 2 I. HALL, A. SANN & S. BELLMAN,
BENEDICT ON ADMIRALTY §§ 1-12 (7th ed. 1980 & Supp. 1982) [hereinafter cited
as BENEDICT].
98. De Lovio v. Boit, 7 F. Cas. 418, 443 (C.C.D. Mass. 1815) (No. 3,776). De Lovio is
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cently, this required both the wrongful act and the damages to occur on
navigable waters.99 Thus, when the origin of a wrong was located on
water, but the damages were suffered on land, there was no admiralty
jurisdiction."O
The Supreme Court in 1972 redefined the jurisdictional test for
admiralty.'' In Executive Jet Aviation, Inc. v. Cleveland, 0 2 the Court
held that admiralty jurisdiction now requires that the cause of action
have a significant relationship to a traditional maritime activity and a
maritime locality. This two-pronged 10 3 test emerged as a response to
criticisms of the old test"° and as a recognition of the fortuitous results
which accompanied the strict locality standard. 10 5
Once admiralty jurisdiction was established, the doctrine of laches
generally applied."° Laches is an affirmative defense 1 7 which bars the
often cited for the following rationale: "[N]ational policy, as well as jurisdictional
logic, require the clause of the constitution to be so construed, as to embrace all
maritime contracts, torts and injuries, or, in other words, to embrace all those
causes which originally and inherently belonged to the admiralty before any
statuable restriction." Id.
99. See Thomas v. Lane, 23 F. Cas. 957, 960 (C.C.D. Me. 1813) (No. 13,902). ("In
regard to torts, I have always understood that the jurisdiction of the admiralty is
exclusively dependant upon the locality of the tort.").
100. The Plymouth, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 20 (1866).
101. Executive Jet Aviation, Inc. v. Cleveland, 409 U.S. 249 (1972).
102. Id In Executive Jet, an airplane carrying the crew took off from Burke Lakefront
Airport in Cleveland, Ohio, and immediately ingested seagulls into its engines.
Id at 250. This caused the engines to lose power, and the plane crashed into
Lake Erie. Although the crew was uninjured, the plane was declared a total loss.
Id. The owners of the airplane sued the air traffic controller, the airport manager,
and the city of Cleveland in its capacity as operator of the airport. The suit was
brought under admiralty jurisdiction, but jurisdiction was denied because the
Court could not find a significant relationship to a traditional maritime activity.
Id at 268.
103. While Executive Jet has generally been interpreted to require a two-pronged test
of locality and nexus, see, e.g., Whittington v. Sewer Constr. Co., 541 F.2d 427
(4th Cir. 1976); Crosson v. Vance, 484 F.2d 840 (4th Cir. 1973), at least one stu-
dent commentator has advocated sole reliance upon the nexus prong. See Note,
Determination of Admiralty Jurisdiction for Products Liability Actions, 22 B.C.L.
REV. 1133 (1981); cf. 7A J. MOORE & A. PELAEZ, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE
325[3], at 209 (2d ed. 1948 & Supp. 1982-83) (courts should concentrate on histori-
cal purposes of admiralty jurisdiction to determine the maritime nexus).
104. See Executive Jet Aviation, Inc. v. Cleveland, 409 U.S. 249, 257 (1972). The criti-
cism cited by the Court dates back to 1850 and relates to the example of bathers in
the ocean: by simply swimming in the water a strict application of the locality test
would invoke admiralty jurisdiction. Id
105. Compare T. Smith & Son, Inc. v. Taylor, 276 U.S. 179 (1928) (no admiralty juris-
diction when longshoreman standing on a pier is knocked into the water) with
Minnie v. Port Huron Terminal Co., 295 U.S. 647 (1935) (admiralty jurisdiction
exists when longshoreman standing on vessel is knocked onto pier).
106. M. NORRIS, THE LAW OF MARITIME PERSONAL INJURIES § 123, at 222 (3d ed.
1975). Exceptions to this rule include salvage suits, 46 U.S.C. § 730 (1976), and
petitions for limitations of liability. Id § 1303(6); see M. NORRIS, supra, § 123, at
222 n.42.
107. FED. R. Civ. P. 8(c).
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plaintiffs recovery when two elements are proven: undue delay by the
plaintiff in filing suit, and resulting prejudice to the defendant from the
delay.1°8 In determining the prejudice suffered by the defendant, the
court considers the "dispersal and inaccessibility of the witnesses, the
dimming of the recollections, and other disadvantages inherent to the
lapse of time."'"9 These considerations mirror the rationale underlying
the statute of limitations. 0 To determine whether the laches doctrine
is proper, courts have generally applied the analogous state statute of
limitations, but the state statute of limitations should serve as a guide
and not a rigid rule."'
2. The White v. Johns-Manville Decision
In White v. Johns-Manville Corp.,112 the Fourth Circuit adopted
admiralty jurisdiction and instructed the trial court on remand to apply
the laches doctrine." 3 Admiralty jurisdiction was adopted because the
two-prong test of Executive Jet was met. First, the court recognized the
admiralty locality of the shipbuilder's work. The locality prong was
satisfied because the plaintiffs worked "aboard the vessels. . . on navi-
gable waters.""' Second, the court acknowledged the significant rela-
tionship of the work to a traditional maritime activity.' 'I This test was
fulfilled because the nature of the plaintiffs work was essential to the
manufacture of the ships." 6 Without the asbestos products and the
work performed by the plaintiffs on board the ships, these vessels could
never have functioned.' ' Thus, the court determined that admiralty
jurisdiction existed and applied the laches doctrine.
The court of appeals in White did not reach the merits of the
laches issue, but it did indicate that the lower court should not mechan-
ically apply the analogous state statute of limitations to determine the
relevant periods of exposure to asbestos for each shipyard worker.' 8
Rather, emphasis should be placed upon the insidious nature of the
108. Costello v. United States, 365 U.S. 265, 282 (1961); see also M. NORRIS, supra
note 106, § 123, at 225 ("Laches consists of two elements: inexcusable delay in
instituting suit and prejudice resulting to the defendant from such delay") (foot-
note omitted).
109. Giddens v. Isbrandtsen Co., 355 F.2d 125, 127 (4th Cir. 1966).
110. See supra notes 51-52 and accompanying text.
111. Benedict, supra note 97, § 62; 2 M. NORRIS, LAW OF SEAMAN § 580, at 108-09 (3d
ed. 1970); see also Giddens v. Isbrandtsen Co., 355 F.2d 125, 127 (4th Cir. 1966)
(recognizing the three year limitations period of the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. § 688
(1976), as "a more logical and acceptable polestar" for analogy than the state
statute of limitations).
112. 662 F.2d 234 (4th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1163 (1982).
113. White, 662 F.2d at 240.
114. Id. at 239.
115. Id. (citing Executive Jet Aviation, Inc. v. Cleveland, 409 U.S. 249, 268 (1972)).
116. White, 662 F.2d at 239.
117. Id
118. Id. at 240.
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asbestos related diseases. "9 Furthermore, the burden of proving an
affirmative defense such as laches rests with the defendant.'
20
The White court implied that some extension of the two year Vir-
ginia statutory limitations period would be welcomed, and this signaled
a broader area of recovery for the plaintiffs. The court, however, failed
to clarify exactly how much of an extension would be welcomed. Con-
sequently, while White makes clear that a mechanical application of
the analogous state statute of limitations will not work under admiralty
law, the lower courts are given no clear standard of how to determine
the limitations period.
3. The Uniform Statute of Limitations for Maritime Torts (46
U.S.C. § 763a)
The confusion created by the laches doctrine 12' may well be solved
by the Uniform Statute of Limitations for Maritime Torts, which is
codified at 46 U.S.C. § 763a.' 22 The statute was enacted by Congress
on October 6, 1980,123 to achieve uniformity in maritime tort deci-
sions. 124 It effectively overrules the laches doctrine in maritime torts by
applying a specific three year limitations period to these torts.
125
Since section 763a is applied prospectively,126 cases pending before
the enactment of the statute remain subject to the laches doctrine.' 2 7
The three year statutory limitations period set forth in section 763a,
however, will apply to a maritime tort cause of action arising after the
date of enactment.' 2 8 Of primary concern is determining when the
cause of action arises under the new statute. 129
119. Id
120. The court of appeals stated: "We do not reach the merits of how far back the
applicable exposure period for each employee should be extended" past the two
year limitations applied by the district court. Id
121. lB BENEDICT, supra note 97, § 5, at 6.
122. 46 U.S.C. § 763a (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
123. Pub. L. No. 96-382, § 1, 94 Stat. 1525 (1980) (codified at 46 U.S.C. § 763a (Supp.
IV 1980)).
124. Uniform Statute of Limitations for Maritime Torts, Pub. L. No. 96-382, 94 Stat.
1525 (1980) (prefatory statement).
125. Nealy v. Fluor Drilling Servs., Inc., 524 F. Supp. 789, 794 n.I (W.D. La. 1981).
126. Ponce v. Graceous Navigation, Inc., 126 Cal. App. 3d 823, 827, 179 Cal. Rptr. 164,
166 (1981); see also Grimshaw v. Ohio Barge Lines, 532 F. Supp. 866 (W.D. Pa.
1981) (statute shall not be applied retroactively).
127. Ponce v. Graceous Navigation, Inc., 126 Cal. App. 3d 823, 827, 179 Cal. Rptr. 164,
167 (1981). This policy has been followed by at least two other courts. See
Belmonte v. Scindia Steam Navigation Co., 523 F. Supp. 530, 531 n.I (S.D.N.Y.
1981); Bush v. Sumitomo Bank & Trust Co., 513 F. Supp. 1051, 1054-55 (E.D.
Tex. 1981).
128. See Bush v. Sumitomo Bank & Trust Co., 513 F. Supp. 1051, 1055 (E.D. Tex.
1981).
129. See Comment, An Explanation of Recurring Issues, supra note 5, at 1319 n.53.
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IV. ANALYSIS: APPLYING THE DISCOVERY RULE TO
SECTION 763a
The Uniform Statute of Limitations for Maritime Torts states:
"[U]nless otherwise specified by law, a suit for recovery of damages for
personal injury or death or both, arising out of a maritime tort, shall
not be maintained unless commenced within three years from the date
the cause of action accrued."' 3 ° Since the statute does not define the
time at which a cause of action accrues, a strong argument can be ad-
vanced for applying the discovery rule in maritime latent disease cases
such as asbestosis. This argument is based upon an extension of the
Supreme Court's decision in Urie v. Thompson 3' and is supported by
decisional law from the Fourth Circuit. Furthermore, the legislative
intent underlying the uniform statutory limitations period provision
sustains the application of this rule in admiralty cases.
A. Congressional Intent
Congress sought uniformity in admiralty decisions in enacting the
three year limitations period for maritime torts. 132 Uniformity would
be further promoted by applying the discovery rule to latent disease
cases under admiralty jurisdiction; 133 application of the rule by means
of a federal statute would grant the same protection to latent disease
plaintiffs throughout the nation. 134
The discovery rule has been applied to a particular class of work-
ers nationwide; the railway workers, under Urie,' 35 have had its protec-
tion since 1949. The Urie rule was adopted to protect railway workers
who suffered from silicosis, a latent disease similar to asbestosis. 136
The protection extended to railway workers should also be provided to
shipyard workers, especially because of the similarity of their occupa-
tional diseases. In addition, since railway workers may develop the
same asbestos related disease as found in shipyard workers, 37 railway
workers in federal court would benefit from the Urie rule. At least two
cases involving railroad carpenters and asbestosis have been filed in
130. 46 U.S.C. § 763a (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
131. 337 U.S. 163 (1949).
132. See supra text accompanying notes 121-25.
133. See generally Annot., I A.L.R. 4th 107 (1980).
134. This in turn would discourage forum shopping, which occurs "when a party at-
tempts to have his action tried in a particular court or jurisdiction where he feels
he will receive the most favorable judgment or verdict." BLACK'S LAW DICTION-
ARY 590 (5th ed. 1979). For example, a plaintiff would seek a jurisdiction with a
discovery rule, such as Maryland, rather than a jurisdiction in which the law is at
best unclear and at worst unfair to a diligent plaintiff, such as Virginia.
135. Urie v. Thompson, 337 U.S. 163 (1949).
136. Asbestosis and silicosis are both forms of pneumoconiosis. See STEDMAN'S MEDI-
CAL DICTIONARY 128-29 (24th ed. 1982).




federal court.' 3 8 The uniformity sought by Congress in enacting sec-
tion 763a' 39 would be defeated by allowing a railroad worker suffering
from asbestosis the benefit of the Urie rule while denying that benefit
to a shipyard worker suffering from the same disease.
B. An Extension of Urie
The similarity of asbestosis and silicosis, both occupational dis-
eases, was remarked upon in Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Products
Corp. 140 and Karjala v. Johns-Man ville Products Corp. 141 In both cases
the courts advocated extension of the Urie rule.' 42 The similarity of the
statutory language interpreted in Urie and the language of the Mari-
time Torts statute constitutes another reason for adoption of the discov-
ery rule in interpreting section 763a.
The Urie decision was based upon an interpretation of the limita-
tions period contained in the Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELA),
a federal statute aimed at protecting railway workers from the hazards
inherent to railroad work. 143 FELA states that "[n]o action shall be
maintained. . . unless commenced within three years from the day the
cause of action accrued."' 44 Similarly, section 763a states "that a cause
of action . . . shall not be maintained unless commenced within three
years from the date the cause of action accrued."'' 45 The language is
virtually identical and offers strong support for the proposition that
Congress intended the discovery rule to apply to section 763a.
A similar argument has been made for applying Urie to the Fed-
eral Tort Claims Act (FTCA)146 on the belief that a diligent plaintiff
138. Id. at 40 n.19. At least one case, Starling v. Seaboard Coast Line R.R., 533 F.
Supp. 183 (S.D. Ga. 1982), has proceeded to judgment on the threshold issues of
marketshare liability and implied warranty.
139. See supra text accompanying notes 121 and 125.
140. 493 F.2d 1076, 1101 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 869 (1974).
141. 523 F.2d 155, 160 (8th Cir. 1975).
142. Urie v. Thompson, 337 U.S. 163 (1949). In Borel, the Fifth Circuit cited the Urie
rationale for adopting the discovery rule:
[Any other rule] would mean that at some past moment in time, un-
known and unknowable even in retrospect the plaintiff Urie was charged
with knowledge of the slow and tragic disintegration of his lungs; under
this view Urie's failure to diagnose within the applicable statute of limi-
tations a disease whose symptoms had not yet obtruded his conscious-
ness would constitute waiver of his right to compensation at the ultimate
day of discovery and disability.
Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Products Corp., 493 F.2d 1076, 1102 (5th Cir. 1973),
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 869 (1974) (quoting Urie v. Thompson, 337 U.S. 163, 169
(1949)). The Karjala court noted that "[a]s in silicosis cases [such as Urie] there is
rarely a magic moment when one exposed to asbestos can be said to have con-
tracted asbestosis .... ." Karjala v. Johns-Manville Products Corp., 523 F.2d
155, 160 (8th Cir. 1975).
143. See Tiller v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 318 U.S. 54, 65 n.21 (1943).
144. 45 U.S.C. § 56 (1976).
145. 46 U.S.C. § 763a (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
146. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(c), 2671-2680 (1976). The FTCA is "scattered throughout the
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deserves the benefit of a more liberal discovery rule.'47 The claims of
asbestos plaintiffs are clearly supported by this analogous rationale be-
cause of the long periods of latency which characterize an asbestos re-
lated disease.'48 Regardless of the plaintiffs diligence in an asbestos
case, the injury often cannot be discovered until at least ten years after
exposure to the product.
C. Fourth Circuit Law
Fourth Circuit decisional law further supports extension of the
Urie decision to latent disease cases under admiralty law. First, Urie
has been expressly adopted by the Fourth Circuit.'49 Second, Banks v.
United States Lines Co. ,10 another Fourth Circuit decision, states that
a limitations period should not commence until the injury has mani-
fested itself. White v. Johns-Manville Products Corp. '' adds further
support to the propriety of adopting the discovery rule because, in that
case, the court was displeased with a mechanical application of the two
year limitations period. The White court, however, left the lower
courts with no clear indication of the proper limitations period. 152
The Fourth Circuit adopted the Urie rule in Young v. Clinchfield
R.R. Co., '3 when a plaintiff brought his FELA action four years after
his last exposure to coal dust. The court relied on Urie to uphold the
plaintiffs claim and cited the "insidious nature" of the plaintiffs silico-
sis as further support for its holding. 154 As in Urie, the plaintiff had a
cognizable cause of action as long as he filed within three years of the
diagnosis, ite., discovery of the disease. 155
In Banks v. United States Lines Co. ,156 the plaintiff was injured
during a fire drill on board ship. Although he had initial symptoms of
pain and swelling, he did not file suit until after the condition had
worsened. 157 By the time he fied, the three year limitations of the
Jones Act' 58 had expired, and the court barred the action. 159 The
Banks court distinguished between a cause of action arising at the time
Code," and serves as a judicial remedy for the tortious conduct of federal employ-
ees. 1 L. JAYSON, HANDLING FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS § 1 (1982).
147. See Note, supra note 54, at 887.
148. For a discussion of the latency characteristics of asbestos diseases, see supra text
accompanying notes 20-22.
149. Young v. Clinchfield R.R. Co., 288 F.2d 499 (4th Cir. 1961).
150. 293 F. Supp. 62, 63 (E.D. Va. 1968).
151. 662 F.2d 234 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1163 (1982).
152. The White court instructed the district court to extend the limitations period for
the plaintiffs, and listed certain factors to consider, e.g., the insidious nature of the
disease and the doctrine of laches. White, 662 F.2d at 240.
153. 288 F.2d 499, 502 (4th Cir. 1961).
154. Id.
155. Id at 503.
156. 293 F. Supp. 62 (E.D. Va. 1968).
157. Id at 63.
158. 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1976).
159. Banks v. United States Lines Co., 293 F. Supp. 62, 68 (E.D. Va. 1968).
[Vol. 13
Asbestos Litigation
of the accident and a latent disease case.' 6 0 Relying on Young, 16 1 the
court noted that had the injury not appeared until several years after
the accident, the analogous statute would not have begun to run until
the injury was discovered.' 62
The decision in White v. Johns-Manville Corp. 163 adds to Fourth
Circuit law by exemplifying the circuit's desire to avoid a mechanical
application of the limitations period. 64 Although limited by the Vir-
ginia state court's refusal to adopt the discovery rule absent legislative
action,165 it is clear from the tone of the White decision that the Fourth
Circuit is willing to utilize admiralty law so as to benefit a diligent
plaintiff. The court of appeals proposed to do this by enlarging the
relevant periods of exposure as determined by the lower court. The
Fourth Circuit considered several factors, such as the insidious nature
of the plaintiff's disease and the allocation of the burden of proof in an
affirmative defense, 166 but the court failed to establish to what degree
the factors are intended to determine the relevant exposure periods. In
the wake of White it remains unclear how far the limitations period
should extend. However, use of the discovery rule could avoid this
confusion. A case-by-case determination, as advocated by the White
court, would still prevail, but the decision would be based upon a clear
standard of when the plaintiff learned of his disease.
The discovery rule has been adopted by a growing number of state
courts, and the application of the discovery rule to federal cases filed
under the FTCA has been advocated as well. 167 The uniform applica-
tion of the discovery rule would eliminate the possibility of forum
shopping by the plaintiff;' 61 in turn, inconsistent decisions among ad-
miralty courts would be avoided.' 69 Thus, the congressional intent 70
motivating the enactment of the Uniform Statute of Limitations for
Maritime Torts would best be served by applying the discovery rule to
latent disease cases.
V. CONCLUSION
Because the Uniform Statute of Limitations for Maritime Torts is
a relatively new statute, courts have had little opportunity to apply its
provisions. Applying the discovery rule to future cases within this stat-
160. Id at 63.
161. Young v. Clinchfield R.R. Co., 288 F.2d 499 (4th Cir. 1961).
162. Banks v. United States Lines Co., 293 F. Supp. 62, 63 (E.D. Va. 1968).
163. 662 F.2d 234 (4th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1163 (1982).
164. See supra text accompanying note 114.
165. See supra text accompanying notes 71-72.
166. White v. Johns-Manville Corp., 662 F.2d 234, 240 (4th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454
U.S. 1163 (1982).
167. See supra text accompanying notes 133, 146.
168. See .upra text accompanying note 134.
169. See supra text accompanying note 121.
170. See supra text accompanying note 124.
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ute would best achieve the congressional policies underlying the statute
because the rule would avoid inconsistent results and confusion in the
lower courts and would bring about the fair and equitable results ac-
complished by a similarly worded statute, the FELA. The inequity of
applying any rule other than the discovery rule to asbestos litigation
under admiralty jurisdiction is illustrated by a comparison of the deci-
sional law in Virginia and Maryland; moreover, at the federal level, the
decisional law of the Fourth Circuit clearly supports this rule. The
Supreme Court's decision in Urie v. Thompson, in which the Court ap-
plied the discovery rule to an insidious disease analogous to asbestos
diseases, also supports the use of the discovery rule. The discovery rule
does not always grant a plaintiff a cause of action, but it does result in a
fair and equitable solution to the limitations problem for latent disease
cases since the limitations period does not begin to run until the plain-
tiff knows he is suffering from the disease.
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